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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL: Let me-- we're expecting some members to join us. 
But because the Assembly is going into session shortly, I thought we would start so at least the 
would have an opportunity to make an opening statement. And if she has to leave, 
to excuse her and expect her to come back after the assembly session. 
Good afternooon. Today we are a Joint Hearing of the Senate Energy and Public 
Utilities Committee and the Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee to receive testimony from 
the PUC Public Staff regarding its report on how much PG&E ratepayers should be for the 
of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. 
As you know, the Public Staff, which is responsible for representing the interests of ratepayers, 
issued a dramatic and controversial to the Commission recommending that PG&E's request for 
$5.5 billion for the construction of the Diablo Plant be reduced by $4.4 billion. Essentially, the staff 
report concluded that PG&E ratepayers should not be charged for Diablo Construction costs caused 
by PG&E management - or 
Our today is neither intended to endorse the staff recommendations nor to reject 
it. the committees have asked the Public Staff to describe the mistakes PG&E made during 
construction and to explain how this record of PG&E mismanagement should be used to 
determine rates. Ultimately, the commissioners will have to choose between two dramatic 
scenarios: PG&E's request for full recovery of the $5.5 billion it cost to build the plant, or the Public 
Staff recommendation. 
In 198 2, I toured the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant to see firsthand what all the fuss was about. 
At the time, PG&E was awash in controversy over construction mismanagement, cost overruns, and 
safety questions. As PG&E tour guides explained which parts of the plant had to be reconstructed, 
due to mistakes in the blueprints, I asked a simple question: "Who got fired?" I was told no one had 
been. 
I discovered that response was misleading. Someone, in fact, was let go. 
A member of the PG&E Assurance Team who raised concerns about was 
instructed to the and was later told there was no more work for him at the 
even other were overtime. He is now PG&E. 
When one reads this report, it becomes apparent that this reckless about was 
pervasive. In fact, the report notes that PG&E management intimidated the Quality Assurance 
Department to the point that it was reluctant to forward engineering audits critical of the safety of 
the pla.11t. 
What are we dealing with here? Not cost overruns, but public safety. As the PUC report 
a massive near the plant, which is not farfetched, could result in the release of 
deadly radioactive materials if the Diablo plant was not designed to withstand the shock. 
While I understand that this :report is being used as the basis for determining how much 
ratepayers should be charged for the Diablo Plant, an equally important issue is raised by the report's 
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the last word on the case, in 
it The us to a 
culture that caused some of the mistakes and 
~t;uuuu~t; of the cure. We to hear about this in 
and distinct from ~"'"'"4""'';:.. how to 
indeed there are losses. This is ultimately an issue of 
that we deal with in our legislative careers simply 
staff's recommendation that PG&E absorb the lion's 
share of the cost resulting from the mistakes and delay. But I also wish to make it clear that the full 
cannot be determined solely by legalisms. This Legislature can and will make the 
framework and the legal framework within which this case will be decided. 
The conclusion of this report is only a stage in the ultimate decision of how California's 
economy absorbs the immense investment of time and money made in Diablo Canyon. I expect to 
hear the PUC what their intentions are as far as maintaining the continuity and the integrity of 
the Diablo ect team in processing the case. 
I'm very much interested, Senator, in hearing the comments of the Public Staff and from the 
executive director, the Public Utilities Commission, because I think the report is only the beginning. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
We will now start with Victor Weisser, the Executive Director of the California Public Utilities 
Commission. 
MR. VICTOR R. WEISSER: Thank you. Chairman Rosenthal and Chairwoman Moore, Members, 
I'm Vic Weisser, the Executive Director of the California Public Utilities Commission. And on behalf 
of the Commission, I want to thank you for this opportunity to have our Public Staff division present 
their Diablo report to you. 
I want to first make sure at this juncture that everyone recognizes that the Public Staff's 
recommendations were developed independent of the five commissioners and have not been endorsed 
them. To put the report in perspective, it's the result of a two and a half year examination by our 
Public Staff and its consultants. The Public Staff is that part of the Commission's staff which has 
been the responsibility to represent the interests of all ratepayers, the long-term interests. 
That means agricultural ratepayers, small and large business customers, residential consumers, 
everyone, for this year and for as long into the future as we can predict. 
In a real sense, the is the start of a process, not the end of it; because with the 
submissions the and other interested parties, it will be the subject of vigorous debate and 
until the of 1989, before the matter is finally submitted to the 
commissioners for their ultimate consideration. The Public Staff's recommendations will be an 
but a Other parties, such as TURN and the 
General's will have other recommendations which will demand and receive full consideration. 
The Commission has made it clear its intent to treat Diablo Canyon not in the fashion as 
business as usual. Barely two weeks after the Public Staff released its report, the Commission held 
an en bane pre-hearing conference to explore with all the parties ideas for scheduling and managing 
the hearings necessary to thoroughly investigate the issues that this matter raises. All commissioners 
participated in this unprecedented pre-hearing conference and heard the parties present their 
suggestions as to the issues which need to be covered and the techniques that could be used to focus 
the hearings. The Commission made it abundantly clear its desire for the parties to avoid the use of 
dilatory tactics which could unnecessarily drift, drag, or delay the proceeding and directed the 
parties to meet and confer, to achieve as far as possible, agreement as to a logical grouping of the 
issues to be heard so that they could be covered in a logical sequence. 
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MR. AHERN: Senator Assemblywoman Moore, it was really the Diablo Canyon 
with the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant and the Helms Creek Pump Storage project, 
the three projects that have had tremendous cost overruns that had motivated the Commission and 
the Public Utilities Commission Staff Management to create the Public Staff division as a separate 
of the Commission's staff that was to be critical of the Utility applications that came 
in """'""'"·!:'. for the money for these projects and to represent the best long-run interests of the Utility 
customers. 
And far, the Diablo project has been our largest project and we a special staff 
team on this. And I would like the members of the Staff team to present to you actually the 
results of our study. Bruce DeBerry is the manager of the technical staff, and he'll give you the 
and discuss the rate 
company. Counsel Ed O'Neill will 
on customers and the financial impacts on the 
to you the Hosgri Fault issue. And counsel Steve Weissman 
of the project team will present to you the Quality Assurance and Mirror Image problem areas. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. DeBerry. 
MR. BRUCE DE BERRY: Senator Rosenthal, Chairwoman Moore, Diablo Canyon, a commercial 
costs approximately $5.5 billion. Of this amount, the Public Staff Division recommends 
that about $1.15 billion be allowed in rates. This amounts to a recommended disallowance of 
$4.4 billion. This cost comparison is shown in Figure 1. The average cost of 
that began construction in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was about $720 
million. Diablo Canyon is by far the most costly and the most lengthy of nuclear power plants that 
would be done this time period. 
Our recommendation is based on three major issues or findings: The first is PG&E should have 
found the Fault before it began construction of the plant and should have incorporated the 
seismic of this fault into its seismic design; secondly, even when the Hosgri Fault was 
known and had been discovered and was publicized, PG&E did not respond to the implications of the 
fault on its u"''"~~>: ... until it was forced to by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; thirdly, the 
such as the Mirror Error, and the other errors that resulted in thousands of modifications 
should not have occurred. 
PG&E has that customers pay the entire $5.5 billion of total cost at completion. This 
amounts to about a 20 percent increase in rates without Diablo Canyon. Diablo Canyon 
construction in 1968. At that time, -yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There's a question from Assemblywoman. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I just have one question, and I'm sorry to interrupt your line of 
thought but I may have to leave and there's some questions that are just -- I'm just dying to ask. 
MR. DE BERRY: Okay. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Got to know the answer to. 
The first thing -- what was the PUC's role, the ones- how come you didn't make PG&E deal 
with the Fault? What was the role of the PUC? I mean since you- your report implies that 
""''""nonu knew the fault was there; there was a lot of information that the fault was there. 
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real in this. 
MR. I don't think we feel comfortable about it, and I don't think the NRC feels 
comfortable about it. The fact of the matter is neither the NRC nor the PUC is ever going to have 
with the right expertise to review each and every management decision that PG&E 
m or building a plant like Diablo. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: But we're not talking about little, minute management. We're 
about the very foundation upon which this plant, a nuclear power plant, was to be built and 
that -- I mean you have to have a staff to do that. I just, you know, have a real concern 
that from the very beginning I'm equally as interested in the role of the PUC as the-- as PG&E. 
MR. Well, these are good questions. And I think, as this case proceeds, we'll probably 
learn more about what the PUC could have done in the early days, perhaps to avoid the problem or 
the problems earlier. And we'll probably learn more about what the NRC and the USGS could 
have done earlier. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Is that what you're going to tell me? 
MR. O'NEILL: Well, yeah. But I think it is important to remember here the primary 
was and still is PG&E's to design and build and operate that plant safely. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'm not eliminating that. But again, one of the reasons that we 
have state agencies or regulatory agencies are because we don't necessarily believe that those people 
that they're regulating are going to do all the things they're supposed to do because they're obligated; 
and, of course, you know, for oversight and, you know, jurisdiction of those authorities, we look to 
those state agencies that have that, that power and that mission and that duty. 
to a 
is not 
MR. O'NEILL: Well, that's correct. We're always going to have to rely though to some degree, 
or lesser degree, on information filed by applicants like PG&E. And if that information 
and is not accurate .•• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I don't want to continue to go round and round because --
MR. O'NEILL: thank you. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -we're not ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN DAN HAUSER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on that same 
Given that PG&E started an earlier facility at Bodega Bay and invested quite a bit of money in 
a hole in the ground only to abandon it when somebody figured out that San Andreas happened 
to be a few yards away, you would think that the Utility themselves would be very interested in 
seismic issues. 
Was there any excuses, legitimate excuses, presented by the Utility to justify their not having 
spent the time and energy and effort to identify potential seismic hazards within the area? 
MR. We tried to review and evaluate the excuses for not doing thorough geo-seismic 
studies in preparing our analysis. And as you can tell from reviewing our report, as you obviously 
have, we didn't find their excuses convincing. You know, there were plenty of reasons why PG&E 
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in the future. 
MR. DE BERRY: Well, when we say that that's -- that's really just an accounting figure. It's 
the amount actually recorded on the books of the company as of the cost of the plant. 
we have a tremendous dispute with the company with regard to the amount that should be 
to ratepayers, in rates. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FARR: And your recommendation is the $1.15? 
MR. DE BERRY: That's correct. I think we probably should add ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblyman Sher, a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BYRON D. SHER: Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I'd like -- instead of 
a -- first of all, I want to apologize for coming in late. I was dealing with a bill up in 
& Means. But I would like, with your indulgence, to make a brief statement about this general 
ect which is primarily a message for the PUC, which I think is appropriate in this context. 
As many of you know, in 1985, I authorized- I authored Assembly Bill1776 which is referred to 
in the background paper that the members have received. That bill was an attempt to bring some 
semblance of order to the law governing the conduct of reasonableness reviews of large utility 
projects. The bill passed the Legislature by a wide margin; it was signed by Governor 
and is now the law. This legislation was motivated specifically by the experience at 
Diablo Canyon. And although Pacific Gas & Electric initially opposed the bill, after we amended 
some of the language, they withdrew their opposition. So the bill passed without the opposition of the 
u 
Section 2 of the bill directs the PUC to specifically address two major issues: The Hosgri Fault 
and the lack of Quality Assurance, and explicitly to identify the costs associated with these two 
or The Public Staff's report responds to that directive, and it should be considered very 
the PUC under the standards contained in Assembly Bill 1776. AB 1776, as I say, is the 
law. And I and other concerned legislators who voted for that bill expect the PUC to follow the 
mandates of that law. AB 1776 mandates that the PUC not make utility customers pay for the costs 
that result from unreasonable mistakes of utility managers in planning, construction, or operation of 
construction ects. The PUC must understand what that standard of conduct is. Some have 
PUC the standard of AB 1776 in the Songs (?) case and the Palo Verde case and 
in the rate portion of the Diablo Canyon case. I think it's important that the PUC not ignore 
the law its consideration, its final consideration, in the Diablo Canyon case. 
The issue is: What is an unreasonable mistake by the utility? And we and the ratepayers in 
California have a right to expect that at a minimum, utility managers meet legally required standards 
of conduct and that they exercise their discretion prudently so as to avoid reasonably foreseeable 
costs and harms. 
And I think what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said when it suspended the Diablo Canyon 
operating license in 1981 is pertinent here, and I'm going to quote exactly what they said, and I'm 
quoting: "Contrary to statements made in PG&E's operating license application, certain structures, 
systems, and components important to safety at the plant may not be properly designed to withstand 
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for " 
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Mr. Chairman, Members, you stated that the 
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7.3 occurred southwest of the plant offshore. They weren't certain of the 
but had enough information that a large fault existed, large enough 
to cause that earthquake, that they should have looked offshore. That was one of roughly five basic 
reasons should have looked offshore. 
the 
Now with regard to the Shell Oil Company data, Shell collected the offshore data from which 
Fault was discovered in the early to mid-1960s. PG&E wasn't aware of Shell's 
as far as we can tell. The Shell oil geologist that identified the Hosgri Fault 
their in January of 1. As far as we can tell, PG&E wasn't aware of this 
article until the Fall of 2., two years after it was published. We believe they could have had 
access to the Shell Oil Company information, had they asked Shell about it, virtually at any time 
that time But we believe they actually did have access to the Shell data until 
sometime in which was the first time that they went and asked Shell to review the data. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE: That being the case, wouldn't it also have been reasonable for 
the PUC to have had this same information? 
MR. The PUC had some information about the 1927 earthquake. It was disclosed on a 
map that was filed with the Public Utilities Commission in the 1960s. The fact of the 
is the PUC appreciate the significance of the 1927 earthquake. The PUC also didn't 
any oil company data. So to some degree, you know, we had an opportunity which we 
of. But on the other hand, we didn't have geologists reviewing PG&E's 
either. And we relied on their statement that the area was free of earthquake faults in 
the immediate and was in area of low seismicity. We basically relied on the representations 
made 
ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE: Without backup material? 
In retrospect, that was a mistake. 
LONGSHORE: On part? 
ROSENTHAL: Well, let me just comment that the PG&E informed the NRC that 
considered offshore to be unnecessary. 
ASSEMBLY MAN That's true, Mr. Chairman, but on the same token, what 
here is that I'm not questioning the $4.1 billion or the amount of the decision of the 
members as regards as to how this should be distributed. What I'm saying is that with that fore-
it would have been prudent and reasonable for the PUC to have denied their license until 
had received the proper backup information. That would also have been reasonable. And I would 
think that the reasonableness here was kind of lost on both sides of the part, to some extent. What 
the extent I'm not certain. And I'm not taking sides. I'm just merely --
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE: -- showing that there was a lack of a diligence as far as PUC is 
concerned as well. 
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done? 
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that PG&E filed. The PUC issued a decision based on 
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Commission. 
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anything in our review that was in that 
made. There were requests made by the agencies 
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alifornia that were 
from PG&:E to do 
nature. I believe the California Resources Agency got 
work. It wasn't real specific; it was a general 
commitment. And as far as we are concerned, based on our review, that general commitment was 
But other than that, we found any requests that weren't complied with. 
g 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator do you have another question? Your light was on; I 
know. 
GREEN: Oh, sorry. 
ROSENTHAL: All If there are no further questions, why don't you continue 
MR. BERRY: Thank you, Senator. I'll continue with a very short history, both of the 
and of the that we conducted. 
Diablo construction in 1968. At that time, its estimated total cost was $320 
million for the two units. And the first unit was estimated to be in operation in 1972. The actual 
some 18 years of course, was the $5.5 billion. This delay and substantial cost overrun 
because the 
can refer you to 
which ends <>n'n""'"v' 
In , the Nuclear 
into account the 
completed three times. 
the first completion spans the period that is identified as original 
in 1976. In 1976, that cost at that time was approximately $1 
Commission then required PG&:E to modify the plant in order 
Fault and the effects on its seismic design as a result of 
that fault. that second period of completion, called "Redesign for Hosgri Fault," the cost at 
end was billion. The third completion occurred as a result of the discovery of 
Mirror Error and the other design errors. That period we've identified is the correction of 
""'"'''""'" errors, and that spanned the until the operation of the two units in 1985 and 1986 in the 
billion. We should point out that PG&:E has applied for an additional $300 million in plan 
the billion that we've identified at commercial operation. 
Staff division began in May of 1984. The team over this time has varied 
it has consisted of around 14 professional individuals in fields of economics, 
and 
Because of state that provided reimbursement from through PG&E's 
the Public Staff was able to hire expert consultants to assist in the study. We 
interviewed approximately 130 consultants in various fields. We have employed during the study 
power 
consultants in fields such as engineering, construction, finance, nuclear licensing, 
seismic design, and other fields that are related to the design and construction of a nuclear 
The study itself required about three years to complete. It comprises 62 volumes of 
and is about 17,000 pages long. As was pointed out by Assemblyman Sher, we 
have followed the legislation that was contained in Assembly Bill 1776 regarding the identification of 
the costs for the Hosgri Fault, as one issue; and the second issue of the Mirror Image Error and the 
related Assurance Program. 
We want to out that our review is based strictly on management performance. In making 
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a great deal of work on this case, at the 
see. 
we go forward on the rest of the case in terms of 
economics? Does that -- does the team together or 
answer to your question is yes, the team stays our 
a of, I believe, one year with two years of renewal-
that they will be with us obviously through the 
with regard to the- whether or not the team remains 
How much are we paying for the team, so to speak? How much 
a little differently. 
and how much more do they before the 
of that As of the 
.4 million in costs. Now 
there are the staff costs of the persons who are from the 
haven't made an exact calculation. That's probably 
would be about another million and a half dollars. 
think that up and to date that PUC has probably 
case? 
''"''u"""~ both staff and its consultants. 
MOORE: Now what would you- could you wager a guess on how 




your entire budget, PUC budget? 
on the case to date, as much as the PUC 
to your spending by the PUC. 
amount of money that you're ,~•:::u,.~.u,,~ to put on the 
given the magnitude of the that they're 
er:~:n<m<u:r:!g that we do not have a maximum limit with regard to the 
for our consultants. However, we should point out that nevertheless 
to remain within some reasonable limits. As we identify 
how much should be the cost that we will need 
in not will make but that have a very 
believe it's one of the most extensive studies of its that 
at least in volume. 
'"'"''· .... ,.,c:: of questions. 
2 and asked how much it cost to reconstruct portions of the 
that I raised the issue about the Mirror of 
that. I was given labor and material costs which were 
cause the costs to escalate 
re:teJrrin!J you to our which 
see that the recorded cost at that time was 
that there was a substantial of direct 
the top line. 
PG&E has that the Staff Report is biased 
been critical of the Diablo Plant the NRC 
best consultants that we could find. And I think they've done 
criticism was I might add, before they had read one word of our 
that our study has nothing to do with questions concerning 
should be built. It has to do with economics. The 
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been. sure everyone that has any 
nuclear power one way or the other. PG&E 
30 consultants an anti-nuclear bias. Frankly, I think that is a pretty good 
And in our 
that the criticism was leveled before they'd read 
!JUJL>v••• the real test is in the report itself. 
ROSENTHAL: It's been stated some that the dramatic size of the Staff's 
to 
Fault and the 
because of the size of it. 
out that we were under the that 
the costs of two major events. And those two events 
errors and the Mirror Image Error that were 
discovered and later on. We have identified those costs. Furthermore, it's our 
that unreasonable costs should not be for ratepayers. We believe that those are unreasonable 
their 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Can I ask-- okay. 
HAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Longshore. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE: I have one more question. How much at the mercy of the 
did the building -- was PG - how constrained were they in that 
upon the contractors? 
O'NEILL: out that the major cost overruns that occurred at 
to do with the contractors per se. were 








shown on that figure to my right; and also, were due to 
events alone were really within the management control 
were involved in the construction. But what we found in our studies 
responsibility for the decisions that led to those 
could elaborate on that a bit. 
bulk cost overruns during the latter phase, which was referred to 
errors, was PG&E's failure to implement the Quality Assurance 




function, if you will, that the U has to undertake 
requirements set forth by the NRC to PG&E included that 
its with outside consultants and contractors, requirements that Quality 
be established by the contractors. In addition, there are certain types of 
Assurance that should be set up by PG&E -- which 
information should not either from PG&E to the consultant or back from the 
- 16-
check. 
the of that 
One of the most graphic illustrations of the 
is traced back to a mistake in that were 
one of the Quality Assurance 
:review take at the contractor level. PG&E auditors were 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 





of time that specifically any 
were considered to be a 
u"'"l='"' on their own. 
discriminate between highly 
Assurance set up ~~·.~~.,~ ... 
And it was that aspect of their 
Mirror Image problem. 
Moore. 
want to kind go back to the 
and those 
with 
to see the Diablo And in with the 
I think, about 34 pipes that had to be changed; that 
a that what the Mirror 
that were to built to hold a 
and to hold it in place; and that those 
and not under the system that it was 
and the of those pipes would have 
to be 
amounted 
your Public Staff report, you claim that it was over Z 
should be responsible. 
account with yours? 
itself was really the of the 
The U had been 
And one 
that there was this Mirror 
structure. Mirror was 
stemming from unlabeled drawings and informal 
failure to check the a proposed 
up. And after that mistake was 
Diablo Canyon plant. And, in fact, the Mirror 
a harder look 
problem 
Was that done by PG&E, or was that done by the-- by the-- by 
done contractors hired by PG&E with the 
ents of the harder look actually were performed by the 
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NRC, believe. 
MOORE: So the company come forward, then we would have never 
what I'm 
WEISSMAN: it's hard to say how these problems would have surfaced; but the 
turned out to be so that they would have come up one way or another. Within 




license be issued 
""u""" the Mirror 
at the 
auditors discovered at least 14 major areas where 
Assemblyman Sher quoted from the NRC as to their 
never would have issued the license had known about these errors in 
after only two of the errors, the staff of the NRC said exactly 
If we had known about these two errors, we would not have recommended that the 
But what is that after the succession of errors was discovered, it became clear that 
there were some underlying problems with engineering management and with the implementation of 
the Quality Assurance A reasonable Quality Assurance Program would have avoided these 
errors, or at least would have led to their detection so they could have been corrected in a timely 
basis. 
MOORE: Let me ask this-- it's my understanding that of the Quality 
Assurance and of the fault problem was that the plant was initially built based on 
another fault that was some distance away and was built to withstand an earthquake had it occurred 
at the- what is it-- San Andreas Fault as opposed to the Hosgri Fault. 
Is that 
MR. Let me to that. The plant was actually designed to withstand 
on a number of faults. But the critical fault- rather, the critical earthquake for the 
an that PG&E assumed could occur beneath the plant roughly 
beneath the site. The problem with that assumption was that it was based on 
studies. And as it turned out, the existence of the Hosgri Fault, some three 
of a very large earthquake on that fault, proved to a 
than PG&E had used. 
what I -- what I what 
-- I guess what I was trying to to all that was that m 
essence that the the was built was faulty. And ••. 
MR. O'NEILL: correct. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You I mean- and according to that, built according 
to this And what saying to me is that had a Quality Assurance Program 
been would that have had any on that? 
MR. O'NEILL: A Quality Assurance Program probably would have had no effect on the gee-
seismic studies. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Because it would have only been to look at the plant as it was 
constructed and built? 
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The Assurance programs required by the NRC had the most 
actual construction activities the site. But Quality Control and Assurance was 
also process. As far as I'm aware, Quality Assurance and 
to studies but in a less formal fashion. At least it's our 
have made any difference in the geo-seismic area. It certainly would have 
made deal of difference with to the design problems that Mr. Weissman covered. 
MOORE: I guess the thing that I keep hearing from you is that there were 
deficiencies. And I guess according to reading the that 
or each of these deficiencies has led to the cost overruns and therefore we come to the 
conclusion that you have. 
an you be very -- are you that comfortable in making that kind of a conclusion 
based on that the deficiencies were solely theirs and .•• 
MR. Well, there are always lots of factors that come into play in a complex 
construction ect like the Diablo anyon project. What we looked for were the root 





mean we found of management, not just in the gee-seismic area or 
control area. We found management deficiencies in the project management, work 
schedule cost control, budgeting. Almost everywhere we looked, we 
And if your is are we comfortable that we have found the basic, root cause of the cost 
overruns, I think we would all agree that we have. Certainly, when you look at particular issues, 
there are to be other contributing factors. But I think the basic causes have been 
management problems. 
MOORE: 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you like to continue with any further or in 
we """'"'"'''· if you are interested, in providing a little more detail 
the the deficiencies in 
have covered much of that material in response 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, you have. 
Would you like summarize? 
MR. BERRY: Let me summarize again what our position is with to our study and 
what recommended. 
our has found that :ratepayers should not pay for unreasonable costs. We have 
determined that the-- of the $5.5 billion that PG&E expended as a commercial operation on the two 
units at Diablo Canyon, that ratepayers should only pay for $1.15 billion of cost. And as has been 
well I this we have found that this cost is a :result of three major issues or 
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The of these is that PG&E should have found the Fault and should have 
its-- the effects of the Fault its seismic design, in construction. 
when the fault was discovered and had been made known, PG&E did not to 
the fault. In with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission over the effects of 
the fault and insisted that their seismic was adequate. 
we believe that the Mirror Error and the other design errors that to the 
tremendous 
based on 
in of 1981 and thereafter, should not have occurred. And 
we believe that it is reasonable for to pay 
.15 billion of cost for that plant. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I've heard that the PUC might welcome a settlement of this case in 
order to avoid What safeguards will be used in the settlement to ensure that all 
effective interests could effectively participate? 
Mr. Weisser. 
MR. WEISSER: Any settlement discussions that are undertaken in the future, if they lead to a 
proposal, would have to be to the Commission and subject to a complete and thorough 
hearing process to ensure that all parties' interests are protected, period. There will be no 
settlement that will be arrived at that will not undergo any, you know, the type of intensive scrutiny 
to ensure that all interests are and that the ratepayers are protected and all intervening 
parties have an opportunity to 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblywoman. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I had a couple of questions. The first was that it appears that--
Vic, don't go away 'cause one of these is going to be for you-- the-- you-- in your report, you 
indicated that the-- in actuality, PG&E built three plants and you've only decided to fund one; and 
that was the first that should have been completed in 1973. 
Is that -- is that what your recommendation is? 
MR. DE BERRY: our recommendation is based on the fact that PG&E did, in 
as I indicated earlier. The three include the 
and the correction of the errors after 
1981. 
Now our our recommendation, is that the have been 
at the time of original construction, which would have been in 
1976. And at that the of the plant would have been about $1.1 billion. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Now that conclusion would appear to me that you totally fault 
PG&E for Their contentions that there was some government delays and a variety of 
other that were not -- that had which are over -- which they had no control -- were 
major contributing factors to the length of time of the play. 
Does that -- your conclusion indicate that you totally disregard it or felt that that had no 
merit? 
MR. DE BERRY: Well, our conclusion, as Mr. O'Neill indicated earlier, is based on what we 
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to the factors that have control over and that, in fact, management could have 
controlled. And these were basic issues with geo-seismic questions and also with Quality 
Control and Assurance that led to the Mirror Image and other design errors. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I guess, of course, hearing that and then the questions that 
evolved from that are one- that some that I heard from some junior high school students who raised 
the Who was PG&E? And you come back to the PUC and yet you have shifted the 
total over there. 
is more directed to you, And it's one that-- the size of this case--
like none that we've never had in the history, given the dollars that are involved-- given the time 
that has during this and the involvement of the PUC over the years with the case -- do 
you it be the interest of the public would be better served if there were -- the 
process was somewhat altered from the norm and perhaps we brought in a masters-type judge 
that -- to the case? Because there are many legal points that are going to be and I just 
would like to hear some comment on that. And could that fit into the time frame that you set forth 
of 21 months? 
MR. WEISSER: Chairwoman let me give you some off-the-cuff initial reactions. I'm 
confident that the Commission has 
ensure that we a 
or not we want to utilize a 
technical 
the type of resources, in terms of people on the case, to 
to the Commission. We looked at the question of whether 
master or special masters for portions of the case, 
of the case, and the belief of the PUC's management--
and is the chief administrative law judge, myself, and other judges that we conferred with, was 
that that would not be a 
me cite an 




W.I-JIJV<>c:: you were to attempt to hire a special master or utilize a 
issues. You would tend to to find a 
What you would be ending up with would 
in with per haps certain preconceptions regarding the 
We think we're best off bringing in an 
in my 
complex cases that would be able to an ..• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: guess the question is: How do we find at the PUC an 
WEISSER: I'm of the administrative law judges that we ..• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I mean this is not-- I don't want you to run back and say Gwen 
Moore is knocking administrative law But it's a real question. And I'm that there's not 
a person in the PUC that probably doesn't have some opinion about the Diablo, Diablo proceedings, 
the Diablo case, the Diablo issue. And I guess that's what I'm really, you know, trying, trying to get 
at. And this case, everybody has some interest in it; everybody has some stake in it because of the 
long-range implications for the entire state. And it's of such a magnitude that I think that we may 
have to look at a little differently than we normally do, particularly because it has 
on for so long. 
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to deal with this case is 
you I want to assure you that we select who are to 
law on the basis of the people's abilities to themselves above 
whatever sort of front-end experience and that the judges that 





have shown their experience that they're capable and 
and litigious issues such as that which we face. 
MOORE: The first judge that handled a deal of this is 
He is but we will be contracting with him for assistance 
the case-- on a part-time basis. He will act as an assistant to the 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask another question, another issue here. the 
and 
the 
allowance were to PG&E's financial position, wouldn't it eventually only serve to hurt 
ratepayers? 
MR. DE BERRY: with regard to the financial implications of our recommendation 
out that was, in fact, one of the reasons why we wanted to make this as I 
Our has indicated that the two-- the first issue is that we believe that could still 
be able to finance its construction program at a reasonable cost. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: but how much more-- when you go to borrow money, what is 
the difference in percentage that you might have to pay? And doesn't that become a cost of the 
ratepayer? 
MR. DE BERRY: We, in our study, have found that approximately -- this is an 
it's based on various assumptions because we've had to assume that the market would do certain 
things. We know now exactly what the market will do in the with both 
to the stock and to the cost of issuing bonds or debt. We have found that the additional cost will be 
deals 
of 
we have also found that that additional cost would 
in the form of additional, 
which has to do with the 
and the debt that the company would 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I know what that means. 
costs due 
at 
MR. DE BERRY: I realize that's -- it's a somewhat of a complicated issue. 
a 
Let me answer your that we do not believe the additional costs 
would flow through to And I can explain that to you if you'd like me 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Over a period of the life of that plant? 
MR. DE BERRY: correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. And finally, in your view, how does the staff report affect 
the issue of the interim rates for Diablo? In other words, on the basis of what the staff is saying, 
should those interim rates be reduced? 
MR. DE BERRY: On the basis of what the staff has presented to date, currently, I believe that 
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the commission to adopt what we have recommended-- there would be a slight reduction in 
current interim rates. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Anything further that you would like to add in your presentation? 
MR. ______ : Thank you very ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I want to thank you for this presentation. Didn't get a chanc~ to 
thank all of those assembly persons who were here and had to go back-- they're in session on the 
sure we'll be talking about this issue for the next 21 months at least. And I thank you very 
for Thank you. 
MR. O'NEILL: Thank you for the opportunity. 
MR. DE BERRY: Thank you, Senator. 
--oOo--
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